Abstract-Digital fingerprinting, a copyright protection technique for digital contents, is considered. Digital fingerprinting should deter collusion attacks, where several fingerprinted copies of the same content are mixed to disturb their fingerprints. In this paper, we consider the averaging attack, which has effect for multimedia fingerprinting. We propose new collusion-secure fingerprinting codes based on finite geometries (FGs) which increase the rate of conventional collusion-secure codes, while they guarantee to identify the same number of colluders. Due to the new FG-based fingerprinting codes, the system can deal with a larger number of users to distribute a digital content.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the high advances of information technologies, a large amount of digital contents can be processed by computers and devising techniques for copyright protection of digital contents has been an important problem to be solved. As one of the most prominent solutions, digital fingerprinting has attracted a great deal of attention. The digital fingerprinting embeds a user's ID called a fingerprint into an original content with a watermarking technique and the fingerprinted contents are distributed to users.
Digital fingerprinting requires robustness against collusion attacks, where more than one illicit user collude to take illegal actions to the distributed contents. One of well-known collusion attacks are the interleaving attack [1] , [4] , [8] , [9] and the averaging attack [4] , [11] , [12] , [13] . W. Trappe et al. have devised collusion-secure codes against the averaging attack based on balanced incomplete block design (BIBD) [11] . The collusion-secure codes devised by Trappe et al. is called BIBD-based anti-collusion (AC) codes and it has been reported that these codes have robustness against the averaging attack [12] .
In this study we propose, based on finite geometries, methods for improving BIBD-based AC codes devised by Trappe et al. or Yang et al. [15] by increasing its coding rate while their resilience is maintained. Consequently, we can realize content distribution system which provides services for greater number of users.
II. FINGERPRINTING MODEL A. Digital Fingerprinting
When distributing a digital content to users, a codeword corresponding to each user is embedded into an original content by a watermarking technique. The codeword allocated This work is supported by Waseda University and the Telecommunications Advancement Foundation (TAF).
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T. Matsushima and S. Hirasawa are with the School of Science and Engineering, Waseda University, Tokyo 169-8555, Japan for each user is called the user's fingerprint. Some illicit users may collude and attempt to disturb their fingerprints so that their fingerprints are not revealed from an illegally utilized content. This action is called a collusion attack. The detector of colluders estimates colluders' fingerprints from the disturbed fingerprint.
Let Γ = {1, 2, . . . , |Γ|} be a set of users of a digital content and we denote a codeword to the user j ∈ Γ by
N , where T denotes the transposition. The fingerprint watermark w j is created by using N orthogonal bases {u i ∈ R N | i = 1, 2, . . . , N} with equal energy and a codeword b j as
Next, regarding the distributed content to users as the host signal, the created watermark signal is embedded into it. Denoting the host signal by a vector x ∈ R N , the distributed content to the user j ∈ Γ is 1 y j = x + w j . Since the fingerprint is embedded by using a watermarking technique, any users cannot detect their own fingerprint w j from the watermarked content y j . Therefore illicit users may collude to disturb their fingerprints by creating an illegal content from their distributed contents.
B. Assumed Collusion Attack
We consider a set of colluders with the size h ≥ 1, denoted by S c ⊆ Γ, and without loss of generality, we assume S c = {1, 2, . . . , h}. The attacked host signal by a set of colluders S c is expressed as
The detector of the colluders estimates the set of colluders S c from the attacked host signal y ∈ R N . This attack is called the averaging attack, which is one of well-known collusion attacks 2 [4] , [11] , [12] , [13] . 1 In this paper, for simplicity, the fingerprinted content is defined in this manner. More precisely, each w j is multiplied by some value called JustDifference Noticeable (JDN) coefficient [7] , before it is added to the host signal. 2 For simplicity, although we only state the case of the averaging attack, the argument here can hold for the logical OR attack [15] . The AC codes devised by J. Yang et al. [15] are also based on BIBD, and the proposed method in this paper can also improve their performance.
III. ANTI-COLLUSION CODES AGAINST AVERAGING ATTACK A. BIBD-based AC Codes
Trappe et al. have proposed BIBD-based anti-collusion (AC) codes [11] . First, we introduce the definition of the AC codes.
Definition 1:
Assume that the host signal x is known to the detector. If the size of a set of colluders S c satisfies |S c | ≤ for some positive constant , the code which can reveal all the colluders in S c is referred to as an -resilient AC code. The parameter is called the resilience of the AC codes. We here consider a mechanism for detecting a set of colluders by using a (k − 1)-resilient AC code. 
As a result of collusion, an illegal content y is produced. The detected sequence y − x = (w i + w j )/2 has a coefficient vector 3 (1, 0, 0, 0, −1, 0, −1), whose position set of the (−1)-entry, {5, 7}, corresponds to the position set Q(S c ), which expresses positions of 0-entry in the both b i and b j . From Remark 1, since a (k − 1)-resilient AC code uniquely identifies Q(S c ) for any S c of the size less than k, the set of positions of (−1)-entry reveals that the user i and j take participate in the collusion. Even for a general case, any (k − 1)-resilient AC code can identify colluders [11] , [12] .
B. Class of AC Codes Based on Finite Geometries
A subclass of BIBD-based AC codes by Trappe et al. can be algebraically constructed by using finite geometries. In this paper, we focus on this subclass of the Trappe'sresilient AC codes based on finite geometries. We briefly describe two kinds of finite geometries. Refer to [5] , [10] for detail.
For a prime p and two positive integers m and For a given µ < m, let a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a µ be µ + 1 linear independent points in EG(m, p s ). Then using µ elements
forms a µ-flat. Any pair of two µ-flats, (F 1 , F 2 ), has at most one (µ − 1)-flat in common, which implies F 1 and F 2 have at most p (µ−1)s points in common. In a Euclidean geometry EG(m, p s ), there are
µ-flats in total. Any pair of two µ-flats, (F 1 , F 2 ), has at most one (µ − 1)-flat in common, which implies F 1 and F 2 have at most (p µs − 1)/(p s − 1) points in common. For simplicity, we use the notation FG(m, p s ) to express either the Euclidean geometry EG(m, p s ) or the projective geometry PG(m, p s ). In a similar manner, f FG (µ) expresses either f EG (µ) or f PG (µ).
Letting (1), which expresses the number of 1-flats in FG(m, p s ). Thus the coding rate r 1 is given by r 1 = log 2 f FG (1)/N 0 . With the constant resilience and code length, as the number of codewords increases, the system can provide services to more users.
IV. RELAXATION OF CONDITIONS ON AC CODES
In this section, we relax the conditions of the BIBD-based AC codes [11] , [12] , which provides flexible construction of the AC codes 4 .
A. Relaxation for General AC Codes Based on BIBD
For a real number v, we express v as the minimum integer not less than v.
Lemma 2: Assume a binary matrix satisfies: (i) the Hamming weight of each column is at least k, and (ii) any pair of distinct two column vectors has at most t 1-entries in common. Then, the AC code obtained from this matrix is a ( k/t − 1)-resilient AC code.
(Proof ) The proof is an extension of that in [11] for the case t ≥ 1.
We denote the position sets in which the j-th column vector has 1-entries by A j . Suppose a set of colluders S c whose size satisfies |S c | ≤ k/t − 1. As in Remark 1, if j∈Sc A j = i∈I A i for arbitrary subset I ⊆ Γ whose size is less than or equal to k/t − 1, S c is uniquely identified. Furthermore, from De Morgan's low, this is equivalent to
Thus it suffices to show eq. (8).
We suppose temporarily that a set I = S c with size 
B. Distortion Given by the AC Codes with Relaxed Condition
In this subsection, we mention distortion to the original content given by the AC codes with the relaxation of the conditions.
The distortion of the digital content for the users can be measured with E[||y j − x|| 2 ], where E[·] and || · || 2 denote the expectation by {b j } and the square of norm, respectively. It follows from y j = x + w j and eq. (1) that the distortion to the contents can be calculated as
where the first equality is obtained by the linearity of the expectation. It can be seen that the distortion takes a constant value N i=1 ||u i || 2 regardless of the probability of symbols of {b j }.
Therefore the distortion to the original content given by the AC codes of Lemma 2 is equal to that of Trappe et al. even if the Hamming weight of the codewords becomes greater.
V. IMPROVEMENT OF AC CODES USING FINITE GEOMETRIES We propose code construction for increasing the coding rate of the conventional AC codes with keeping resilience.
A. AC Codes Based on Finite Geometries
In this subsection, we describe an explicit code construction in Lemma 2 by using finite geometries.
When we construct the -resilient AC codes of Trappe et al. by using finite geometries FG(m, p s ), relationship between points and lines (1-flats) in FG(m, p s ) is considered. In the new code construction, relationship between points and µ-flats (µ ≥ 1) in FG(m, p s ) will be utilized.
Definition 2:
For µ ≥ 1, let B µ be the incident matrix of µ-flats over points in a finite geometry FG(m, p s ), and we denote its j-th column vector by b j . Allocating b j to the j-th user's fingerprint, the obtained code B µ = {b j } is called the µ-th order FG-AC code. In particular, the AC code B µ constructed from the Euclid geometry and the projective geometry are called the µ-th order EG-AC code and the µ-th order PG-AC code, respectively. 2
We then have the following theorem. From Theorem 1, it can be found that the resilience of a µ-th order FG-AC code B µ is independent of the order µ of the flats.
We here mention parameters of the µ-th order FG-AC codes. For a given FG(m, p s ), we can have m − 1 µ-th order FG-AC codes B µ for µ = 1, 2, . . . , m − 1 with the same resilience. From the properties of the incident matrix of µ-flats over points, the code lengths of these FG-AC codes B µ are equally N 0 and the numbers of codewords are f FG (µ). The coding rate, denoted by r µ , is given by r µ = log 2 f FG (µ)/N 0 . i.e., parameter of B µ depending on the order µ is only the number of codewords, which determines the best FG-AC code B µ * with the maximal size for a given FG(m, p s ). Therefore we call such order µ * the maximal order of the FG-AC codes for a given FG(m, p s ).
Thus we have the following theorem. 
B. Examples of FG-AC Codes with the Maximal Order
For a given EG(m, p s ), we show examples of EG-AC codes B µ * with the maximal order in Table I . For m > 3, we display codes with the resilience (p s − 1) greater than one in the increasing order of their length. In the table, the columns of "log 2 f EG (1)" and "log 2 f EG (µ * )" express the logarithm of the number of codewords of B 1 (the Trappe's AC code) and that of the EG-AC code B µ * with the maximal order.
It follows from the property of the function f EG (µ) that the number of codewords of B µ * becomes larger than that of B 1 as the dimension m of EG(m, p s ) increases. In particular, the number of codewords of B µ * is 2 2 times larger than that of B µ * when m ≥ 5, 2 6.5 times larger for EG (7, 3) , and 2
10
times larger for EG (8, 3) . We also show examples of PG-AC codes B µ * with the maximal order in Table II low-density parity check (LDPC) matrix without cycles of length four [5] can be used for constructing a (k−1)-resilient AC code. In this section, we show how to improve such AC codes when we use LDPC matrices with quasi-cyclic (QC) structure.
γp ms × ρp ms . If any pair of two columns of the matrix M 0 has at most one 1-entry in common, M 0 is called a regular (γ, ρ) QC-LDPC matrix.
The QC-LDPC matrices is used for constructing errorcorrecting codes [5] and there have been proposed many types of QC-LDPC matrices. QC-LDPC matrices based on the structure of the Reed-Solomon code [2] , [6] or based on the structure of the Array codes [3] , [14] are one of the examples assumed in this paper.
Another QC-LDPC matrix defined over a Galois field GF(p ms ) can be considered. This matrix consists of two types of columns, namely the first type is of the Hamming weight γ and the other is of the Hamming weight γ − 1. 
B. Improvement of AC Codes Based on Regular QuasiCyclic LDPC Matrix
Since a regular (γ, ρ) QC-LDPC matrix satisfies (i) each column weight is γ, (ii) any pair of two columns has one 1-entry in common, any AC code whose codewords are arranged from column vectors of M 0 is a (γ−1)-resilient AC code. We denote this AC code by M 0 and call conventional AC codes based on QC-LDPC matrices.
We here propose a method for increasing the number of codewords while maintaining the code length, the resilience by using a similar technique in Sect. V. For a Euclidian geometry EG(m, p s ), let B µ be a p ms × f EG (µ) incident matrix of the µ-flats over points. We substitute the (i, j)-th circulant matrix π ai,j (I) (i = 1, 2, . . . , γ, j = 1, 2, . . . , ρ) of M 0 with a matrix π ai,j (B µ ), which can be obtained to right-shift the matrix B µ a i,j times. We denote the resultant γp ms × ρf EG (µ) matrix by M µ . Let M µ be an AC code whose codewords are column vectors of M µ , and we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3:
The AC code M µ for a given EG(m, p s ) has (i) the code length γp ms , (ii) the number of codewords ρf EG (µ) and (iii) the resilience = min{γ −1, p s −1}.
(Proof ) Since both (i) the code length and (ii) the number of codewords are easily verified, we here mention (iii), the resilience. We partition γp ms rows of the matrix M µ by p ms rows into γ groups, and we call the ν-th group (the (νp ms + 1)-th row to (ν+1)p ms -th row) the ν-th row section. By expressing each column vector m j ∈ {0, 1} [1,γ] A j,ν = i∈I ν∈ [1,γ] A i,ν .
In this case, it requires A j * ,ν ⊆ i∈I ν∈ [1,γ] It follows from Theorems 3 that we can improve AC codes which are constructed based on a QC-LDPC matrix over a Galois field by using Euclidean geometry EG(m, p s ). In particular, if γ − 1 < p s and we utilize the relationship between the µ-flats and points over EG(m, p s ), the AC codes M µ are always more efficient than the conventional code M 0 . About the obtained AC codes in this section, we can assert a similar effectiveness mentioned in Sect. V-B.
We state some relationship between the conventional AC code M 0 and the AC code M µ for a given EG(m, p s ). If we denote the incident matrix of 0-flats (namely, points) over points in EG(m, p s ) by B 0 , there is a relationship I = B 0 . Therefore, it follows from substituting µ = 0 in the matrix M µ that we can obtain the matrix M 0 . This fact implies that the conventional AC code M 0 based on QC-LDPC matrix is an instance of the AC codes M µ when µ = 0. Thus a class of the AC codes M µ includes the AC code M 0 as a special case.
As illustration of the obtained EG-AC codes based on QC-LDPC matrices, we show some examples by assuming QC-LDPC matrix based on Reed-Solomon code [2] in Table  III . For GF(p ms ), (γ, ρ) QC-LDPC matrices with 1 ≤ γ ≤ p ms − 1 and 1 ≤ ρ ≤ p ms can be constructed. We choose some γ and fix the value of ρ as ρ = p ms to construct AC codes as large as possible. We show the logarithm of the code size for M 0 in the column of "log 2 ρf EG (0)" and for M µ * in that of "log 2 ρf EG (µ * )".
Using the projective geometry PG(m, p s ), we can obtain a similar result. We only show the result without the proof.
Theorem 4:
Assume that we allocate each column vector of the incident matrix of µ-flats over points in PG(m, p s ) to a user's codeword. This AC code has (i) the code length γ(p (m+1)s − 1)/(p s − 1), (ii) the number of codewords ρf PG (µ), and (iii) the resilience 
C. AC Codes Based on Partially Regular Quasi-Cyclic LDPC Matrix
Since a partially regular ({γ, γ − 1}, ρ) QC-LDPC matrix satisfies (i) each column weight is at least γ − 1, (ii) any pair of two columns has at most one 1-entry in common, any AC code obtained from this matrix is a (γ − 2)-resilient AC code from Lemma 2. However we can show its resilience is greater than γ − 2.
Lemma 3: AC codes constructed from a partially regular ({γ, γ − 1}, ρ) QC-LDPC matrix are (γ − 1)-resilient AC codes. (Proof ) Noting that any pair of two columns with the Hamming weight γ − 1 has no 1-entries in common, we can prove the lemma.
2
As in Sect. VI-B, we can use an improved method for increasing the number of codewords, while keeping the code length and the resilience. For a Euclidean geometry EG(m, p s ), consider extracting the zero point from this geometry and the all lines including the zero point are reduced to lines without this point. Let B µ be a (p ms − 1) × f EG (µ) matrix whose rows corresponds to non-zero points in EG(m, p s ) and columns corresponds to the obtained lines. If γ − 1 < p s , the AC code is also a (γ − 1)-resilient AC code.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS
In this paper, for a class of AC codes proposed by Trappe et al., novel methods for increasing their coding rate were proposed based on finite geometries, while their resilience is maintained. We showed examples of the AC codes with the maximal number of codewords for a given finite geometry. The obtained AC code can have the greater number of codewords than the conventional AC code by Trappe et al. as the dimension m of the finite geometry FG(m, p 2 ) increases. Taking a similar approach to this construction method, other methods for constructing efficient AC codes based on quasicyclic LDPC matrices were also proposed. In this method, although all the case does not necessarily guarantee the same resilience, conditions on parameters which provides the same resilience were derived. Consequently, we can construct a fingerprinting system which can provide service of distributing a digital content for more users, while keeping both the resilience and the distortion to the original digital contents.
Unfortunately, the codes obtained by the proposed method have comparatively large code lengths, which implies the distortion to the original content by these codes may be large. An effective shortening method of the code while the resilience is maintained should be devised.
In this paper, the resilience is guaranteed by assuming no noise sequence. The performance of the AC codes should be analyzed when there occurs a noise sequence.
